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Abstract 
 
We analyze a newly available dataset of migration policy decisions reported by governments to 
the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007. We 
find evidence indicating that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the 
status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also document variation in migration policy 
over time and across countries of different regions and income levels. Finally, we examine 
patterns in various aspects of destination countries’ migration policies (policies towards family 
reunification, temporary vs. permanent migration, high-skilled migration). This analysis leads us 
to investigate the determinants of migration policy in a destination country. We develop a 
political economy framework in which voter attitudes represent a key component. We survey the 
literature on the determinants of public opinion towards immigrants and examine the link 
between these attitudes and governments’ policy decisions. While we find evidence broadly 
consistent with the median voter model, we conclude that this framework is not sufficient to 
understand actual migration policies. We discuss evidence which suggests that interest-groups 
dynamics may play a very important role. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As it has been pointed out by many observers (Freeman 2006, Pritchett 2006) we are 
experiencing a wave of globalization that involves everything but labor. Capital flows have 
increased dramatically in the past decades, trade is becoming more and more important as a share 
of world GDP, but as of today only slightly less than three per cent of the world population lives 
in a country different from the one in which it was born. Every year, international migration 
flows involve on average only one in 600 individuals (United Nations).  
What explains the modest size of observed flows of people across borders? The income 
gap between sending and receiving countries is still substantial, whereas transportation and 
communication costs have declined rapidly in the past few decades. Thus, supply side 
considerations would seem to imply – if anything – an increase in the flow of migrants. It 
follows that the most likely driver of the limited flows is to be found on the demand side, and it 
is represented by the migration policies implemented by the receiving countries. 
The first goal of this paper is to carry out a survey of the existing literature on the 
political economy of migration policy. In particular, we review studies of individual attitudes 
towards migration as well as political economy frameworks – such as the median-voter and the 
interest-groups models – which have been developed to link attitudes to actual migration policy.  
The second goal is to provide a characterization of the restrictiveness of policies towards 
migration reported by governments to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs between 1976 and 2007. We find evidence that most governments have policies aimed at 
either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also document 
variation in migration policy over time and across countries of different regions and income 
levels. Finally, we examine patterns in different aspects of destination countries’ migration 
policies (policies towards family reunification, temporary vs. permanent migration, high-skilled 
migration).  
Next, we merge the information contained in this dataset with cross-country data on 
individual attitudes towards immigrants. We use data on public opinion from the International 
Social Survey Programme, National Identity Module, for the years 1995 and 2003, and from the 
World Value Survey, for the years 1995-97. The merged datasets allow us to investigate whether 
– within a median voter framework (Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005, Facchini and Testa 2008) – 
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voters’ migration attitudes are consistent with migration policy decisions as reported by 
governments.  
Our answer is yes, but only in part. Given the very low fractions of voters in favor of 
increasing the number of immigrants in the majority of destination countries, restrictive 
migration policies are broadly consistent with a median voter framework. We also find that in 
countries where the median voter and, in general, public opinion are more favorable to 
migration, governments’ policies tend to be more open. In other words, there exists a positive 
correlation between actual migration policy and public opinion across countries. This evidence 
suggests that policy makers take public opinion into account as they formulate policy decisions, 
which is in line with the predictions of the median voter model. 
However, given the extent of opposition to migration revealed by voters’ attitudes in the 
majority of destination countries, it is a puzzle that migration is allowed to take place at all. We 
document a “public opinion gap”, i.e. a gap between very restrictionist public opinion on one 
side, and more open stated policy goals on the other. We conclude the paper by discussing 
alternative analytical frameworks – in particular, the interest groups model (Facchini and 
Willmann, 2005) – which help reconcile the evidence on attitudes with the patterns of migration 
policy decisions. Work in the literature suggests that many interest groups are pro-migration – 
for example, native workers who are complemented by foreign immigrants and capital owners 
(Facchini and Mayda 2008, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra, 2008). The activities of these groups 
can explain the public opinion gap. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature, while section 3 describes both the individual level and country level data we are using. 
Section 4 presents evidence on the median voter model and discusses the results in the literature 
on the interest groups model, while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
How do migration policies come about? In developing our analysis, we will review the 
explanations that have been proposed in the economics literature, while referring the interested 
reader to Joppke (1998), Money (1997), Freeman G. (1992) and Freeman G. (1995) for 
important contributions in the political science field.  
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A useful conceptual scheme to analyze the migration policy formation process - which is 
based on Rodrik (1995)1 - is illustrated in Figure 1. The basic idea is that the formulation of 
migration policies involves at least four elements. First, policy making necessarily needs to take 
into account voters’ individual preferences, and how these preferences are shaped by the inflows 
of foreign workers. Both economic and non-economic factors are likely to play a role in shaping 
public opinion (non-economic factors more so than in the context of trade policy). The second 
step is to map these preferences into a policy demand. Various channels have been suggested in 
the literature, ranging from pressure groups to grass-roots movements (Benhabib 1996, Facchini 
and Willmann 2005, Ortega 2005). On the supply side of migration policies, we need to identify 
the policy maker preferences, and finally, we need to understand the details of the institutional 
setting in which they are introduced. 
  Building upon this framework, we will review the existing literature. Our starting point is 
the analysis of drivers of individual attitudes towards immigration. 
 
                                                 
1 Rodrik (1995) uses the conceptual scheme in Figure 1 to analyze trade policy outcomes. 
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2.1 What drives individual attitudes towards immigration? 
 
A substantial body of literature has studied the effect of both economic and non economic 
factors on attitudes towards immigration. The overall message from these studies is that, whereas 
non economic drivers have an important and independent effect on individual preferences, 
economic characteristics of the respondents are shown to systematically shape attitudes towards 
international labor mobility.  
The early contributions have mainly focused on individual countries like the United 
States (see for example Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, 
Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and the United Kingdom (Dustmann and Preston 2001, 2004, 2007). 
More recently, cross country studies have taken advantage of newly available social surveys, 
which cover large samples of both advanced and developing countries (Chiswick and Hatton 
Figure 1:  Determination of immigration policy
pressure groups, political 
parties, grass-roots 
movements (B)
individual preferences on 
immigration policy
(A)
institutional structure of 
government
(D)
policymaker preferences
(C)
Immigration policy outcomes
“demand side”
of immigration 
policy
“supply side”
of immigration 
policy
5 
 
2003, Mayda 2006, O’Rourke and Sinnott 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2007, 2008) and allow 
richer studies.  
The analysis of the economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration focuses on 
the income distribution effects of the inflow of foreign workers. Most of the existing literature 
considers a highly stylized economy that is usually described by a simple factor proportions 
analysis or a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. In both these frameworks, ignoring cases 
in which wages are not affected, the labor market effects of immigration depend on the skill 
composition of the migrants relative to the natives in the destination country. If immigrants are 
on average less skilled than the native population, their presence will hurt unskilled and benefit 
skilled natives. On the other hand, if immigrants are on average more skilled than natives, they 
will benefit the domestic unskilled, while hurting the skilled.  
In an early influential study using the 1992 US National Election Study, Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001) analyze the labor-market drivers of attitudes towards immigration and find 
support for the theoretical predictions we have just discussed. In particular, in the United States, 
where immigrants are on average less skilled than natives, unskilled workers are more likely to 
oppose immigrants than skilled ones.  
Using the 1995 round of the International Social Survey Panel and the 1995-1997 round 
of the World Value Survey, Mayda (2006) can fully exploit the predictions of the model by 
taking advantage of the different skill composition of migrants across countries. She finds strong 
evidence suggesting that individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes 
in countries where immigrants are on average unskilled, while it is negatively correlated with pro 
immigration attitudes in countries where migrants are on average more skilled than the native 
population. 
The main OECD destination countries of immigrant flows are often characterized by 
large welfare states (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick 2002), in which the public sector 
redistributes a substantial fraction of national income across individuals. In these contexts, 
immigration has a non-negligible impact on public finances, since foreign workers both 
contribute to and benefit from the welfare state. The aggregate net effect of immigration on the 
welfare state is either positive or negative, depending on the socio-economic characteristics of 
immigrants relative to natives. 
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To understand how the welfare state shapes attitudes towards immigration, we follow 
Facchini and Mayda (2007) and consider a simple redistributive welfare state, characterized by a 
linear income tax and assume that revenues are lump-sum rebated to all citizens. In this model, 
an inflow of unskilled migrants (relative to natives) will make all natives worse off, by causing a 
given level of redistribution to become more costly. More specifically, if the welfare state adjusts 
through a change in the taxation level, in order to maintain the same level of per capita benefits 
(tax adjustment model), higher income individuals will be more negatively affected, as they are 
on the “contributing” end of the system. On the other hand, if the adjustment takes place through 
changes in the size of per capita benefits, in order to keep the same level of taxation (benefit 
adjustment model), lower income individuals will be the ones more adversely affected by 
immigration, as they are on the “receiving” end of the system. If, on the other hand, an inflow of 
skilled migrants takes place, all the above effects are reversed. All natives will gain with 
migration through the welfare-state channel. Under the tax adjustment model, higher-income 
individuals will be more positively affected than poor ones by the decrease in tax rates. Under 
the benefit adjustment model, lower-income individuals will be more positively affected than 
rich ones, given that the increase in per capita benefits is mostly relevant for this income 
category. Figures 1 and 2 (adapted from Facchini and Mayda 2008) represent the correlations 
between individual income and pro-migration attitudes implied by the tax adjustment model and 
the benefit adjustment model, respectively, when migration is unskilled (right panel) and skilled 
(left panel). Finally, besides the income distribution effects outlined above, an “efficiency” 
channel can be identified – since the destination economy as a whole will gain from international 
migration (the destination country’s “migration surplus”). The efficiency channel is independent 
from the skill composition of migrants relative to natives and results in an increase in the tax 
base. 
In their analysis of the variation in attitudes across US states, Hanson, Scheve and 
Slaughter (2007) implicitly assume the tax adjustment model to hold. They find evidence that the 
positive correlation between pro-immigration attitudes and education – driven by the labor 
market – becomes smaller in absolute value and even negative in US states where the fiscal 
exposure to immigration is high. This evidence provides empirical support for the tax adjustment 
model, since education and income tend to be positively correlated at the individual level. 
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Using two surveys covering a large sample of advanced countries, and information on 
both the characteristics of the immigrant population and of the destination country’s welfare 
state, Facchini and Mayda (2007) also find evidence consistent with the tax adjustment model. In 
countries where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is 
negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is positively 
correlated with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in economies characterized by 
skilled migration (relative to the native population). Thus, their results suggest that the very same 
skilled and high income German businessman may feel ambivalent regarding the arrival of 
unskilled immigrants since he might benefit from hiring them (labor market complementarity) 
but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state. The authors confirm these results when 
they exploit international differences in the characteristics of the destination countries' welfare 
state. 
Which economic channel matters most in shaping attitudes? Focusing on a group of 
advanced countries, Dustmann and Preston (2007) show that welfare state determinants are more 
important than the two other economic channels (labor-market competition and efficiency 
considerations) in shaping immigration preferences. 
Until now we have focused on economic determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. 
Besides this set of drivers, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and 
Sinnott (2005) also consider factors such as the perceived crime and cultural impact of 
immigration, racism, sciovinsm etc, although these factors are not the main focus of their 
analysis. A recent work investigates, instead, the role played by media exposure in shaping 
migration preferences (Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi 2009). This paper uses the CCES survey, 
which took place before the 2006 US midterm elections, and analyses the link between attitudes 
towards two alternative migration reform proposals – being discussed at the time in the House 
and in the Senate – and the evening news program watched by the respondent. Controlling for 
ideology, income and education, Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi (2009) find that individuals 
watching Fox News are 16% more likely to oppose the more lenient Senate plan, which allows a 
path to citizenship for illegal migrants. The paper finds a weaker effect, but in the same 
direction, for CNN viewers. Finally, compared to the other networks, individuals preferring PBS 
are more likely to support the Senate plan. 
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To conclude, data on public opinion allows us to investigate voters’ perceptions towards 
different aspects of globalization. The existing cross-country evidence on migration preferences 
suggests that individuals are on average remarkably averse to more open migration policies. For 
instance, on average across 22 industrialized countries, in 1995 only 7.4% of the population 
favoured a more open migration policy. Similarly, in 2003, this figure was still only 10.9%. On 
the other hand, individuals seem to be much warmer towards another facet of globalization, i.e. 
international trade. In fact, using the same dataset, Mayda (2008) finds that in 1995, 23% of the 
respondents favoured a more open trade regime. What explains this difference?  
From the point of view of a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, the 
labor market effect of an inflow of unskilled workers through migration or an inflow of unskilled 
labor services embodied in unskilled labor intensive goods should be very similar. However, if 
not all goods are traded and factors are not perfectly mobile across sectors (i.e., if a short-run 
horizon is assumed), this result does not necessarily hold.   
Mayda (2008), for instance, focuses on the role of traded versus non traded sectors. She 
finds evidence of one important source of the difference between trade and migration opinion: 
the cleavage in trade preferences, absent in immigration attitudes, between individuals working 
in traded as opposed to non-traded sectors. In other words, working in a non-traded sector 
increases the likelihood of being pro-trade, while it does not affect migration attitudes: Workers 
in non-traded sectors feel shielded from foreign competition working through trade but not from 
the increased labor-market competition brought about by immigration. These results are 
intuitive, since immigrants can work in both traded and non-traded sectors, while trade 
liberalization does not directly affect incomes in non-traded sectors. 
An alternative explanation of the different perception of trade and migration focuses on 
public finance considerations: migrants both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, 
while traded goods do neither. This channel has been explored by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 
(2007) who, for the United States, identify the welfare state as an important driver of the gap 
between trade and migration preferences. However, their argument is a good explanation of 
differences in attitudinal responses only if immigrants are perceived as a net burden for the 
destination country’s welfare state, as in the US. This might not be true in other contexts, for 
example, if the skill composition of immigrants relative to natives is high. Facchini and Mayda 
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(2007) find that, if the latter condition holds, individual attitudes are consistent with a perception 
of immigrants as net contributors to the welfare state.  
Another explanation, which has not been pursued formally so far, focuses on the 
difference in the size of the impact of non-economic factors. While it is true that trade creates 
social tensions through the pressure it exerts towards “arbitrage in national norms and social 
institutions” (Rodrik 1997, p.29), the societal and cultural effects of immigration can be expected 
to be much more direct. Finally, another way to understand the preference gap is by realizing that 
immigrants or their children can acquire citizenship and, therefore, affect the destination 
country’s political balance across different groups (Ortega 2005). To the extent that natives do 
not favour this influence of outsiders on their political life, this channel can provide another 
explanation of the difference in public opinion on trade vs. migration. 
 
2.2 From individual preferences to migration policy 
 
Individual preferences are aggregated and become political demands thanks to the 
working of grass-root movements, political parties and/or interest groups (box B in Figure 1). 
This process of aggregation is clearly affected by how severe the collective action problem is for 
certain groups, which in turn is affected by several factors, for example the geographic 
concentration of members of a group. 
On the supply side of migration policy, government preferences play an important role 
(box C). Do officials care only about aggregate welfare, i.e. do they just wish to maximize 
society’s well being? Do they care only about being re-elected? Are their choices driven by 
ideological considerations? Do they care more about the demands of specific groups within 
society – i.e. do they intend to use migration policy as a tool to transfer resources to a specific 
group? 
Finally, the institutional structure of the government, i.e. whether for instance the 
electoral system is majoritarian or proportional, or more specifically which body is in charge of 
setting migration policy plays an important role (box D).  
These three dimensions of the policy making process are modelled together by the 
existing literature, and the detail to which they are analyzed, varies substantially. While quite a 
bit of attention has been dedicated to the process through which individual preferences are 
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aggregated, the policy makers preferences are modelled in a very reduced form fashion, and 
almost no attention is paid to the details of the institutional setting in which migration policy is 
set. This is an important shortcoming, as the destination countries vary substantially in their 
political institutions. In the remainder of this section, we will review the two main frameworks 
which have been proposed by the literature, the median voter framework and the pressure group 
model, and assess their empirical performance. 
 
2.2.1 The median voter model 
 
What is the migration policy chosen by a stylized democracy? In a very elegant paper, 
Benhabib (1996) considers the human (physical) capital requirements that would be imposed on 
potential immigrants by an income-maximizing polity under majority voting. Output is modeled 
using a constant returns to scale production function combining labor with human (or physical) 
capital. Each individual is endowed with labor and capital, and the distribution of the latter in 
both the native and (potential) immigrant populations are known. Benhabib shows that the policy 
that will defeat any other in a binary contest is the one in which the median voter chooses to 
admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are complementary to her own endowment. 
This implies that, if the median voter is unskilled, she will choose the policy that guarantees the 
highest possible ex-post average level of human capital. To achieve this objective, she will set a 
lower bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and only foreigners with a level of human (or 
physical) capital above that threshold will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is 
highly educated, she will choose the policy that minimizes the ex-post average human capital 
level in society, by setting an upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus 
admitting only individuals with low levels of education.  
While this model importantly highlights the role of complementarities between domestic 
and foreign production factors in shaping migration policy, and provides an intuitive 
characterization of the policy choices, it presents two important shortcomings. First of all, due to 
the constant returns to scale assumption, the optimal policy does not identify the actual size of 
the optimal inflow. It only identifies the skill composition of the flow of migrants. This is clearly 
at odds with the policies followed by countries all around the world. The second – practical – 
difficulty is that in case of a skilled median voter it is going to be very difficult to enforce a 
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policy that sets an upper bound to the skill level of an individual to be admitted by a country. 
How can a potential migrant with a high level of education be forced to report his academic 
achievements in order to give up the possibility to immigrate in a given country? 
To deal with the first limitation of the model, one possibility is to consider a production 
structure where returns to scale are decreasing in the mobile factors. An alternative solution has 
been proposed by Ortega (2005). In a dynamic extension of Benhabib’s model the author 
explores the tradeoff between the short run economic impact of immigration and its medium to 
long run political effect. In particular, while immigration affects only the labor market in the 
current period, in the future it also influences the political balance of the destination country, as 
the descendants of migrants gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled natives 
prefer an immigration policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to 
complementarities in production, this policy will increase the skilled wage. On the other, the 
arrival of unskilled immigrants and the persistence of skill levels across generations can give rise 
to a situation in which unskilled workers gain the political majority and, therefore, vote for 
policies that benefit them as a group. Thus, through the political channel, skilled natives prefer 
an immigration policy that admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between these two 
forces allows Ortega to characterize under which conditions an equilibrium migration quota 
might arise, i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the size of the migration inflows. 
 
2.2.2 The pressure group model 
 
While the median voter model is a useful framework to understand the process of 
aggregation of individual preferences into migration policy, it is hardly able to capture the 
complexity of the political process in modern democratic societies.  In particular, there is 
substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that interest groups representing specific subsets of 
society have been very actively involved in shaping policy towards immigration. For instance, in 
the United States – at least until very recently – labor unions have played an active role in 
limiting the inflows of foreign workers (Briggs 2001, Watts 2002). This was true already for the 
enactment of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which was strongly supported by the newborn 
Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions, and labor unions have played an important 
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role in supporting other immigration restricting pieces of legislation, like the 1917 Literacy test 
provision (Goldin 1994) and, more recently, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.  
At the same time, there is ample evidence on the role played by pro immigrant lobbies, 
representing the business sector, in shaping migration policy. For example, already in the 
discussion that surrounded the introduction of the Literacy Test provision of 1917, lobby groups 
representing capital owners were actively engaged in trying to block the measure (Goldin 1994). 
More recently, during the boom of the late nineties, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs trooped in front 
of Congress asking for an increase in the number of H1B visas for highly skilled professionals, 
and warning of a looming Y2K disaster if the large number of foreign engineers and computer 
scientists they requested was not allowed to enter the country (Goldsborough 2000). Similarly, in 
2005 Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland obtained the creation of a new visa category – 
the H2R visas – as a result of intensive lobbying by the seafood industry of her home state, 
which had not been allowed to hire any temporary worker under the existing H2B visa category 
that year. Interestingly, this pattern is common across many destination countries. For instance, 
in August 2006, at the peak of the debate in the UK on whether to put a cap on migration from 
Bulgaria and Romania once the two countries become members of the European Union, the 
Business for New Europe group (BNE) issued a statement saying that “...the UK should continue 
with its open door policy.”2 
To formally study the role played by pressure groups in shaping policy towards 
international factor mobility Facchini and Willmann (2005) develop a simple theoretical model, 
which is based upon the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). 
In their setting, policy is determined as the result of the interaction between organized groups 
representing production factors, who maximize the net welfare of their members, and an elected 
politician who - in determining policy - trades off aggregate welfare vis a vis political 
contribution. Using a one-good multiple factors framework, Facchini and Willmann (2005) find 
that policies depend on both whether a production factor is represented or not by a lobby and on 
the degree of substitutability/complementarity between domestic and imported factors. In 
particular, they show first of all that a non-organized factor will not be able to influence the 
policy determination process. Secondly, an organized factor will instead be effective in reducing 
                                                 
2 This is a UK based pressure group. The heads of the supermarket chain Sainsburys and the head of the European 
division of investment bank Merrill Lynch were among the signatories. 
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the inflow of a substitute, while it will increase the inflow of a complement. Thus, this model is 
able to rationalize both the intense lobbying activities recently carried out for instance by the 
healthcare providers in the United States, which  resulted in the introduction of the new H1C visa 
category in 1999, and the fierce opposition of the union representing local nurses (Facchini, 
Mayda and Mishra 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Empirical analysis 
 
Our empirical understanding of the demand side of immigration is still limited. A 
growing body of the literature presents a series of very interesting historical accounts of the 
political economy of immigration restrictions between the end of the XIX century and the 
beginning of the XX century (Goldin 1994, Timmer and Williamson 1996). Goldin’s (1994) 
classic work on the introduction of the Literacy test provision has highlighted the role played by 
both the AFL and the Knight of Labor in supporting this measure. Timmer and Williamson 
(1996) have instead taken a cross-country perspective and documented both the pervasiveness of 
policy intervention to shape migration flows towards both North and South American countries, 
and the drivers of those policies. In particular, they have pointed out the role played by active 
business lobby groups in subsidizing migration in labor scarce regions, like in the case of the 
coffee grower lobby of Sao Paolo state in Brazil at the end of the XIX- beginning of the XX 
century. 
However, there are only few papers that have looked at what drives current policies. In 
an interesting contribution, Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) focus on U.S. border enforcement 
and show that enforcement softens when sectors using illegal immigrants expand. The authors 
suggest that sectors that benefit greatly from lower border enforcement lobby politicians on the 
issue, while sectors that benefit modestly are less politically active. 
In a more recent paper, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) take a more systematic 
perspective and look at the impact of targeted lobbying activity by both pro and anti-immigration 
pressure groups on the allocation of work and related visas in the United States in the period 
2001-2005. Using data on lobbying expenditure on immigration policy, which have become 
recently available, they find not only that interest groups play a statistically significant role in 
shaping policy, but more importantly that their activities have substantial economic effects. They 
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estimate that a 10 per cent increase in lobbying expenditures by business groups in a given sector 
leads on average to a 2.3-7.4 per cent increase in the number of work visas allocated to that 
sector. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in labor union density translates into a 2.6-10.4 percent 
decrease in the number of visas issued to that sector. 
 
3. Patterns of opinions towards immigration 
 
In this section, we document patterns of attitudes towards immigration. We start by 
focusing on two large individual level datasets which cover a broad cross section of countries, 
including advanced, middle income and less developed countries. Next, we explore government 
views and policies surveyed by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
between 1976 and 2007, and examine how voters’ attitudes are reflected in the policies which are 
reported to be in force. 
 
3.1 Individual attitudes towards immigrants  
 
Are natives in favour of or against an increase in migration to their countries? Are there 
differences in public opinion towards immigration across destination countries? We consider 
evidence from two sets of individual level surveys. The first is the National Identity module of 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (see also Mayda 2006 and Facchini and 
Mayda 2007), which has been carried out in 1995 and 2003 and covers a large sample of 
respondents from mainly advanced OECD and middle income countries (see Tables 1, 2 for 
summary statistics based on these surveys). The second is represented by the third wave of the 
World Value Survey (WVS), which was carried out in 1995-1997. The WVS data set includes 
more than 50,000 respondents based in 44 mostly developing countries (see Table 3 for summary 
statics based on this survey).  
To construct measures of attitudes towards immigration from the ISSP survey, we use 
respondents’ answers to the following question: “There are different opinions about immigrants 
from other countries living in (respondent’s country). By “immigrants” we mean people who 
come to settle in (respondent’s country). Do you think the number of immigrants to 
(respondent’s country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the 
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same as it is, (d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot”? The survey format also allows for 
“can’t choose” and “not available” responses (which we treat as missing values and thus exclude 
from the sample in our specifications)  
In 1995, in the sample of countries considered (see list in Table 1), individuals are on 
average very opposed to immigration: only 7.39% of individuals – who give an opinion on this 
issue – agree with the statement that the number of immigrants to their countries should be 
increased either a little or a lot. The average of the variable Pro Immig Opinion in the overall 
sample equals 2.13.3  Finally, the median value of the same variable in the overall sample is 
equal to 2. 
In addition, Column 9 in Table 1 clearly shows that there exists substantial variation 
across countries in terms of individual attitudes towards immigrants. In 1995, Canada and 
Ireland are the countries most favourable to migration (with, respectively, 20.61% and 19.10% of 
their population favouring an increase in the number of immigrants) while Latvia and Hungary 
are the most opposed (with, respectively, 0.45% and 1.48% of their population supporting higher 
migration). In general, most Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by very 
low percentages of voters favouring migration (Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, 
Slovak Republic). Among Western European countries, Italy (3.55%) and Germany (2.54%) 
have the most hostile public opinion to immigration. Besides Ireland, Spain is the Western 
European country whose citizenry is most receptive towards migrants (8.44%). Finally, in the 
United States, 8.05% of the population welcomes increases in migration. 
The 2003 data set, based on a larger sample of countries (see list of countries in Table 2), 
confirms that voters are indeed hostile to immigration on average: only 10.84% of individuals – 
who give an opinion about migration – in the overall sample of countries agrees that the number 
of immigrants should be increased either a little or a lot. The average of the variable Pro Immig 
Opinion in the overall sample equals 2.29. Finally, the median value of the same variable is, in 
the overall sample, again equal to 2. 
Like in 1995, there are substantial differences in attitudes towards immigrants across 
countries in 2003. In particular, Column 9 in Table 2 shows that in Canada and Israel, 
respectively, 29.02% and 27.14% of the population favours an increase in the number of 
                                                 
3 Pro Immig Opinion uses answers to the immigration question and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a 
lot). 
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immigrants, while in Hungary and Latvia these percentages are, respectively, equal to 2.18% and 
2.60%. Among Western European countries, Portugal (3.09%), the Netherlands (3.72%) and 
Germany (4.06%) show the public opinion that is most hostile to immigration. Finland (24.10%) 
is the only Western European country among the top five most open countries towards 
migration. In the United States, 9.8% of individuals favours larger numbers of immigrants, 
which is a higher percentage than in 1995 (8.05%): this is remarkable given that the September 
11 terrorist attacks took place in 2001, i.e. between the two surveys. In France, 7.37% of voters 
welcomes increases in migration.  
The immigration question in the 1995 round of the WVS asks the following: “How about 
people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the 
government should do? (a) Let anyone come who wants to? (b) Let people come as long as there 
are jobs available? (c) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? (d) 
Prohibit people coming here from other countries? (e) Don’t know.” Summary statistics are 
reported in Table 3. To simplify the exposition, we have also constructed a Pro Immig Opinion 
variable which uses answers to the immigration question and ranges from 1 (prohibit) to 4 (let 
anyone). 
As can be seen from Column 9 in Table 3, 53% of individuals who gave an opinion are in 
favour of “letting anyone come who wants to” or of “letting people in as long as there are jobs 
available”. The average of the variable Pro Immig Opinion in the overall sample equals 2.53.  
Finally, the median value of the same variable in the overall sample is equal to 3.  
Notice that the values of immigration attitudes in the WVS display much more 
favourable opinions towards migration than the ISSP dataset. This can be due in part to the 
different wording of the question. However, the most important reason for this difference is 
likely to be the different coverage of countries in the two samples. While the ISSP dataset mostly 
covers middle and high income countries – and therefore is representative of the most important 
destinations of migration flows in the world – the WVS mostly covers low income countries, 
which may be more favourable to migration because they are at the same time immigration and 
emigration countries. 
As in the case of the ISSP surveys, average data hide substantial differences in attitudes 
towards immigrants across countries. In particular, Column 8 in Table 3 shows that in Azerbaijan 
and Bosnia, respectively, 78% and 76% of the population favours an increase in the number of 
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immigrants, while in the Philippines and Macedonia these percentages are, respectively, equal to 
25% and 32%.  
 
3.2 Government views towards immigration 
 
The 1974 World Population Conference held in Bucharest developed a World Population 
Plan of Action and called for a systematic monitoring of population policies across member 
countries. Data have been collected since the mid seventies and provide information on a broad 
range of issues.  
Concerning immigration, two sets of questions have been asked. First, an effort has been 
carried out to elicit governments’ views on the overall level of immigration. Second, information 
has been collected on government policies towards immigration, both at the aggregate level, as 
well as with respect to specific issues.  
We start by considering government views. View on immigration is the government’s 
view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for 
permanent settlement, temporary, high skilled work and family reunification. Government views 
towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable.4 
The variable can take three possible values: “too high”, “satisfactory” and “too low”. The 
summary statistics are reported in Table 4. As we can see, on average for the period considered 
(1976-2007) about 79% of the officials who have been interviewed have claimed to be satisfied 
with the current levels of immigration. 17% deem the immigration level too high, while only 5% 
share the view that immigration is too low (these percentages are broadly similar when we focus 
on Western European and North American countries, which represent the main destinations of 
migration flows – see Table A1). Thus overall governments’ views appear to be more favorable 
to immigration than individual voters’ attitudes. While this “public opinion gap” has been 
pointed out before in previous works (see, for example, Freeman 1992, Joppke 1998, Facchini 
and Mayda 2008), the UN dataset allows us to document it quantitatively for the first time in the 
literature. 
                                                 
4 Notice that this question does not focus on the desired level of immigration in the country, but rather on the change 
compared to the existing status quo. While the phrasing of the question is not ideal for the purpose of eliciting 
government preferences on the overall level of immigration, the wording chosen is very closed to the one used in the 
individual level surveys we have discussed in section 3.1. 
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This aggregate data hides a substantial degree of heterogeneity both over time and across 
country groups (see top and bottom panel of Table 4). Over time, between 1976 and 2007, the 
number of countries where immigration levels are perceived to be “too high” becomes almost 
three times as large. This is true even though the pattern is nonlinear: between 1976 and 1996 we 
observe a monotonic increase in the share of governments opposed to immigration while, 
between 1996 and 2007, a slight decline (from 21% to 17%). Consistent with that, the share of 
governments which perceive immigration levels as too low has declined from 7.3% to 5.6% 
between 1976 and 2007, but again the pattern is non-linear. In general, governments’ views 
towards migration worsen between 1976 and 1996 and improve in the last decade. 
It is also interesting to explore how views are affected by different levels of development. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports summary statistics according to income levels (we use the 
World Bank classification of high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low 
income countries, as contained in the 2009 World Development Report). It is immediately 
evident that governments are more likely to perceive migration levels as too high, the higher is 
the per capita income level in the receiving country. Per capita GDP is thought to be a good 
proxy for the size of migration flows and the relative skill composition of the native vs. 
immigrant populations – i.e., richer countries receive on average larger flows and more unskilled 
immigrants relative to natives (Mayda 2006 and Mayda 2009). The summary statistics for 
governments’ view are then consistent with evidence that larger flows of migrants and unskilled 
migrants are perceived less favourably by individual voters as well (Mayda 2006, Facchini and 
Mayda 2008).  
Considering different regions of the World (Table A1 in the Appendix), it is interesting to 
notice that among the most important destinations, officials in the Gulf countries5 are the most 
concerned with the current levels of immigration. On average, 46 percent of the respondents in 
Gulf countries believe immigration levels to be too high. By comparison, in Western Europe and 
North America, 29% and 27% of the officials respectively share the same view. 
To conclude, the left panel of Table A4, documents the patterns in governments’ opinion 
according to the human development index (HDI), distinguishing four groups of countries (low 
HDI, medium HDI, high HDI, very high HDI). The patterns we find are broadly comparable to 
those reported in Table 4.  
                                                 
5 Gulf countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates. 
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3.3 Government policies towards immigration 
 
Although a systematic, objective measurement of the restrictiveness of immigration 
policies does not exist on a cross-country comparable scale, the United Nations collect a wide 
range of information on government policies towards immigration through a survey of each 
country’s government officials.6 The survey questions cover not only the general policy, but also 
individual policy aspects. 
  Table 5 reports summary statistics on policies regarding the “overall level of 
immigration”.7 While 11% of the officials report that their country did not pursue an active 
migration policy, the majority of government officials appears to exhibit a strong status quo bias. 
On average, between 1976 and 2007, over 60% of the government respondents reports that their 
country has policies in place to keep immigration levels unchanged. On the other hand, 23% 
reports that their countries have actively pursued a reduction in immigration flows, while only 
5% reports that their countries have tried to increase immigration levels. These summary 
statistics confirm the “public opinion gap” pointed out above: governments’ policies are more 
liberal than individual voters’ public opinion. 
Once again, aggregate data hide substantial heterogeneity. Over time, the number of 
countries which have implemented policies geared towards lowering immigration flows has 
fluctuated widely. In 1976 less than 7% of the officials interviewed report policies aimed at 
reducing inflows, while in 1996 this number grows to over 40%. In 2007, this number shrinks to 
19%, suggesting a growing acceptance of migration.  
Across country groups, destinations with higher GDP per capita are more likely to report 
restrictive immigration policies in place (bottom panel of Table 5). This mirrors closely the 
findings on government views. Looking at geographic aggregates (Table A1 in the Appendix), 
the Gulf countries stand out as the group most actively pursuing policies aimed at reducing 
immigrant flows, with 50% of the officials interviewed characterizing policy in this way. 
Similarly, 46% of Western European officials also report policies in place to reduce foreign 
                                                 
6 See UN “World Population Policies”, various issues. 
7 Notice that the question on governments’ policy does not explicitly distinguish between stocks and flows of 
immigrants. Also, the contents of the question on governments’ views and governments’ policy are slightly 
different. In the former, issues related to asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are specifically 
excluded, while in the latter no such distinction is explicitly made. 
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workers arrivals, while the same is true for only 20% of their North American counterparts. 
Similar results are obtained if we use instead the HDI (right panel of Table A4).  
Migration policy involves the use of a complex array of measures, and several important 
dimensions are considered in the data published by the UN. The first important distinction 
involves permanent vs. temporary migration, and both in 1996 and 2007 officials have been 
asked to state whether policy on permanent settlement (temporary workers) has been aimed at 
lowering, maintaining, increasing the current level or has involved no intervention at all (Tables 
6, 7).  
Overall, slightly over 20% of the respondents report no specific intervention on either 
dimension. Over 40% aim instead at maintaining the current levels of permanent/temporary 
settlements, while 28-30% try to lower these levels. Only 4-5% of the respondents report that 
their policies had actually the objective of increasing the overall number of migrants. 
Interestingly, comparing the two years for which we have data, we can see that the fraction of 
officials reporting policies in place to maintain the current levels of permanent and temporary 
migrants has substantially increased between 1996 and 2007, from 20-25% to 58-60%. This 
suggest once again growing acceptance of the phenomenon.  
Looking across income groups (bottom panel of Tables 6, 7), we can notice how high 
GDP countries have a more interventionist stance (only 4-6% of the respondents report no 
intervention), and are on average more likely to have policies that are both aimed at reducing 
permanent settlements (43% vs. a sample average of 30%) and the number of temporary workers 
(37% vs. a sample average of 28%). Among the immigrant destinations, Gulf countries stand out 
once again as the most likely to have active policies in place to limit both temporary and 
permanent settlement (88% and 67% respectively) (Table A2 in the Appendix). North America is 
instead the region in which officials are more likely to be trying to raise the inflow of both 
temporary and permanent immigrants (17% and 14% respectively). 
The main channels of entry of immigrants into a destination country are family 
reunification, work, and asylum seeker/political refugee. As selective policies have become more 
widespread, it is interesting to investigate the role played by the channel of entry – as it has been 
shown to have an important role in shaping the skill composition of the foreign population 
arriving in the country.8 Officials have been asked whether governments have policies in place to 
                                                 
8 See for instance Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002), Borjas (1999). 
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raise/maintain/lower migration for family reunification or if they do not actively intervene in this 
policy area. Summary statistics are reported in Table 8. Interestingly, they suggests that less than 
4% of the countries considered have policies in place to increase the number of immigrants 
arriving for the purpose of family reunification, while 16% are actively trying to make it harder 
to migrate taking advantage of this channel. Interestingly, it is important to notice that over time 
the acceptance of family reunification as a channel of entry has vastly increased. As reported by 
the OECD (2008), 44% of the new immigrants arrived in OECD countries in 2006 were admitted 
as family members, and in face of this development, government policies are becoming more 
accommodating. In fact, in 1996 only 27% of the officials reported efforts to maintain the current 
immigration levels through this channel, while 25% indicated that policy was trying to limit the 
inflows for the purpose of family reunification. In 2007, these figures had changed to 68% and 
9% respectively.  
As both theoretical models and the empirical evidence suggest, the skill composition of 
migrants compared to the native population is likely to be a key factor to understand the labor 
market impact of immigration. In the 2007 survey, a question has been introduced to assess the 
policies implemented towards highly skilled workers (Table 9). Officials in only five countries 
(Bhutan, Botswana, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) have reported that 
policies are in place to reduce the arrivals of this type of workers. Over 80% of the countries in 
the sample have instead policies in place to maintain or increase the number of skilled migrants 
arriving.  
This finding is particularly interesting. From our previous discussion of the labor market 
effects of immigration, we expect that skilled migrants will be welcome in countries where 
skilled labor is the scarce factor (and therefore the median voter is likely to be unskilled), but it 
will not be viewed favourably in countries that are skilled labor abundant (i.e. countries where 
the median voter might be skilled). The results from the UN survey suggest instead that 
government policies are favourable to skilled migrants also in countries where skilled labor is 
“abundant”. There are at least three possible explanations for this result. First, through the 
welfare state channel, every individual – both skilled and unskilled – prefers skilled migration to 
unskilled migration, since skilled (unskilled) migrants are likely to represent a net contribution 
(burden) for the destination country’s welfare state. Secondly, high income countries might 
prefer highly skilled migrant workers for simple but intuitive political reasons. Natives might 
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realize that immigrants or their children will eventually become citizens and thus will be allowed 
to vote. If skill levels are persistent across generations – as the existing evidence suggests 
(Ortega 2005)- skilled native voters will favor (oppose) skilled (unskilled) migrants because the 
latter ones will tend to vote for policies that favor skilled (unskilled) individuals (Ortega 2005). 
Third, the cultural assimilation of highly skilled migration is easier than for low-skilled migrants 
and therefore countries of different income groups in general tend to prefer highly skilled 
migrants (Chiswick and Miller 2006). The results we obtain by grouping countries according to 
the HDI are very similar to the ones obtained when we consider a GDP based classification (see 
Tables A5, A6).  
Finally, as the number of individuals living in foreign countries has rapidly grown in the 
past decades, it is important to assess whether destination countries are actively promoting the 
integration of immigrants. A question on this issue has been asked both in 1996 and 2007 
(Tables 10, 11 and 12). On average, 54% of the officials interviewed report active integration 
policies to be in place, and this number has grown over time (from 44% in 1996 to 64% in 2007).  
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of high income countries (82%) have policies in place 
for the integration of foreigners, while poorer countries appear to be less active in this policy 
area. This result is confirmed in Table A7, where we investigate the determinants of policies on 
the integration of non-citizens. While it appears at first that countries receiving higher immigrant 
inflows are the ones promoting integration policies (see columns (1) and (4)), it is the per capita 
GDP of the destination country which seems to drive this result. In other words, higher income 
countries (which are also the ones receiving larger immigrant inflows) are more likely to develop 
integration policies (see columns (2) and (5)). Finally, we find some evidence that countries 
characterized by less skilled immigrants are more likely to promote integration policies (see 
columns (3) and (6)). 
 
  4. Individual opinions and immigration policy  
 
In a democratic society, voters’ attitudes should be the basis of policy making. This idea 
is at the core of the median voter model according to which migration policy should be 
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correlated with the opinion of the median voter and, more in general, with public opinion.9 We 
next evaluate whether these predictions are consistent with the data. 
Our first piece of evidence are the summary statistics in Table 1 (ISSP 1995) and Table 2 
(ISSP 2003). They show that voters across countries are, on average, very much opposed to 
immigration. According to the ISSP dataset, in 1995 less than 10% of individuals who express an 
opinion about migration would like the number of immigrants to increase. In 2003 the 
percentage is only slightly higher than 10%.10 Given restrictive migration policies observed 
across destination countries, this evidence is indeed consistent with the median-voter framework.  
Figures 3-5 and Tables 13-14 provide additional evidence which is consistent with the 
median-voter model. Figure 3 and the left hand panel of Table 13 use data on attitudes from the 
1995 ISSP dataset. Figure 4 and Table 14 use data on attitudes from the 2003 ISSP dataset. 
Finally, Figure 5 and the right hand panel of Table 13 use data on attitudes from the 1995-1997 
WVS. In these figures and tables, we show that migration policy across countries is positively 
correlated with the opinion of the median voter and, in general, public opinion across countries.11 
In particular, we start by relating the opinion on immigration of the median voter in each 
country to the migration policy of that country, as reported by its government to the United 
Nations. We identify the median voter using the Pro Immig Opinion variable: we rank 
individuals in each country according to their Pro Immig Opinion value and we next select the 
individual who corresponds to the 50th percentile (the opinion of this individual – median Pro 
Immig Opinion – appears in column (8), Table 1, in column (8), Table 2 and in column (7), Table 
3). We find that the two variables – the opinion on immigration of the median voter and the 
migration policy of each country – are positively correlated with each other, even though this 
result is not always statistically significant (the regression results appear in columns (1) and (4), 
Table 13 and column (1), Table 14).  
                                                 
9 From the literature on the determinants of individual attitudes, we know that in a country that receives unskilled 
migrants relative to natives, a voter (and therefore the median voter) will be pro migration the more skilled he is. On 
the other hand if immigration is skilled, a voter (and therefore the median voter) will favour less restrictive policies, 
the more unskilled he is. 
10 As mentioned before, the evidence in Table 3 (WVS 1995) shows more favourable opinions, however the survey 
question is worded differently and, most importantly, the sample in the WVS dataset covers mainly developing 
countries. 
11 See also Figures A1 and A2 and Table A8, which relate migration flows (divided by population) to attitudes and 
to migration policy, using the 1995 ISSP dataset. 
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Next, we carry out a set of robustness checks, considering the impact on the migration 
policy of each country of average attitudes towards immigrants (the average of the Pro Immig 
Opinion variable, which appears in column (7), Table 1, in column (7), Table 2, and in column 
(6), Table 3). Once again, the correlation is positive and almost always significant (the regression 
results appear in columns (2) and (5), Table 13 and column (2), Table 14). Finally, we look at the 
impact on migration policy of the fraction of voters, in each country, favourable to an increase in 
the number of immigrants (the average of the Pro-Immig Dummy variable, which appears in 
column (9), Table 1, in column (9), Table 2, and in column (8), Table 3). We find a positive and 
this time always significant correlation between the two variables (the regression results appear 
in columns (3) and (6), Table 13 and column (3), Table 14). The higher significance of the 
correlation between actual policy and voters preferences obtained using the opinion of the 
average rather than the median voter seems to suggest that the views of “extreme” groups play an 
important role in shaping policy measures. This suggests that the direct democracy model might 
be too simple to capture all the complexities of the political process. Finally, notice that these 
figures and tables treat the independent variable (attitudes) as given and exogenous. This 
assumption might be problematic. In particular, our estimates might be biased because of reverse 
causality: i.e., migration policy will impact migration inflows, which in turn may themselves 
affect attitudes. As a matter of fact, Mayda (2006) finds that, in countries with higher immigrant 
inflows, voters tend to be on average more opposed to immigration. Notice, however, that this 
reverse causality biases the coefficients in our tables and figures towards zero, thus it is not 
problematic for our results. Hence, Figures 3-5 and Tables 13-14 provide evidence which is 
broadly consistent with the median-voter framework. 
This evidence is the first of its kind and complements our previous work (Facchini and 
Mayda 2008). In that paper, we have used an indirect measure of migration policy, i.e. net 
migration flows to each destination country. In this paper, on the other hand, we consider a direct 
measure of migration policy decisions, i.e. reports to the UN by government officials in each 
destination country. This represents a substantial improvement relative to our previous work 
since net migration flows are an equilibrium outcome, i.e. the result of the interaction between 
demand and supply factors. Instead, government officials’ reports on immigration policy are a 
pure “demand” indicator. In addition, the UN dataset we use in this paper allows us to document 
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differences in migration policies across a much larger set of countries and over a longer period of 
time, spanning over three decades. 
While the empirical evidence in this section is consistent with the median-voter model, it 
is clear that this framework is not sufficient to explain migration policy decisions. In the 
summary statistics section, we have documented a systematic gap between very restrictionist 
public opinion and more open government policies. What are the other factors which are relevant 
in shaping governments’ migration policies and help explain the public opinion gap? 
In Facchini and Mayda (2008) we investigate the impact of interest groups. We focus on 
the United States and use a panel covering the period 1995-2005. Differentiating labor according 
to both skill levels and occupation, we find systematic evidence suggesting that the lobbying 
activities of organized labor lead to an increase in the inflow of foreign workers in different 
occupation/education cells. This effect is likely to be driven by complementarity.12 In addition, 
as mentioned above, Facchini Mayda and Mishra (2008) find even stronger evidence that pro-
migration interest groups make policy more open to migration. The number of temporary work 
visas in a given sector is positively affected by the lobbying expenditures for migration of firms 
in that sector. This is consistent with the interest groups model, given that capital and labor are 
complements. As mentioned in the introduction, interest groups are likely to be a very important 
factor explaining the gap between public opinion and government policies. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have used a newly available dataset on migration policy decisions reported 
by governments, which has been constructed by the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs. We have found evidence suggesting that most governments have policies 
aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. For example, 
between 1976 and 2007, approximately 61% of the government officials interviewed reported 
policies to maintain the status quo, while 23% were trying to reduce the number of immigrants.  
We have then merged the UN dataset with two large individual level surveys, the ISSP and 
the WVS. We have found evidence suggesting that government policies are correlated with 
                                                 
12 We also find evidence of an effect driven by substitutability. The lobbying activity of organized labor leads to a 
reduction in the inflow of foreign workers in the same occupation/education cell. 
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individual opinions, as it is consistent with a simple median voter model. Still, individual 
opinions appear to be substantially more restrictionist that the actual policies implemented by 
governments. Thus, we have documented – for the first time in a quantitative assessment – the 
existence of a public opinion gap.  
We have argued that the activities of pro-immigration interest groups, which heavily lobby 
governments in destination countries, are a primary candidate to explain the public opinion gap 
we have documented. Of course, alternative factors can also be at work. For example, another 
reason why migration flows continue to take place – notwithstanding the great opposition of 
voters in destination countries – is that policymakers may not have full control on migration 
inflows through their policies. In other words, migration pressure on the supply side might give 
rise to increasing inflows through illegal migration. We tend to believe that this is an implausible 
explanation, that is we think that governments are not willing – rather than able – to block 
migration inflows. For instance, it is well known that most destination countries manage 
migration through border enforcement rather than interior enforcement, although the latter is 
much more effective than the former (Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001). Thus, allowing large 
flows of illegal immigrants like those which have been estimated for the United States between 
1995 and 2005 (Passel 2005) might well represent a government attempt to reconcile the 
restrictionist views of the broader public and the pro-migration requests of domestic pressure 
groups. Analogously, the (re)introduction of guest worker programs – like the one which was 
part of the failed Kennedy-McCain proposal in 2005 - suggests that increasing temporary 
migration might be another possible politically viable way of allowing the needed pool of talents 
into the country. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (ISSP 1995) and country-level variables
The survey sample excludes non-citizens. Pro Immig Opinion uses answers to the immigration question ("Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...":
reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot) and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a lot). Pro-Immig Dummy equals one if Pro Immig
Opinion is equal to 4 or 5, zero if Pro Immig Opinion is equal to 1, 2 or 3. Both variables exclude missing values. net migration is equal to the net migration inflow, divided by the
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Data on policy on immigration 1996  is from the United Nations.
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
(
6
)
median 
Pro 
Immig 
Opinion 
(8)
net 
migration 
1996 (14)
relative 
skill mix 
(natives 
vs. imm) 
(13)
average 
educ 
years 
(10)
median 
educ 
years 
(11)
per 
capita 
GDP, 
PPP (12)
Pro Immig Opinion
average 
Pro 
Immig 
Opinion 
(7)
average 
Pro-
Immig 
Dummy 
(9)
Country
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
 
l
o
t
 
(
1
)
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
 
(
2
)
r
e
m
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
a
s
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
(
3
)
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
a
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
 
(
4
)
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
a
 
l
o
t
 
(
5
)
Australia 16.79 19.65 34.71 15.81 5.72 7.32 2.72 3 0.23 13.06 13 33011 1.50 3
Austria 32.72 26.75 29.94 5.25 1.03 4.31 2.11 2 0.07 11.08 10 35974 2.13 2
Bulgaria 16.17 18.89 20.11 2.26 0.85 41.72 2.19 2 0.05 11.11 11 10665 2
Canada 10.21 18.65 34.51 19.92 5.99 10.72 2.92 3 0.29 13.46 13 36178 1.65 3
Chile 22.78 37.23 29.23 4.84 1.61 4.31 2.22 2 0.07 10.71 12 13108 2
Czech Republic 26.19 30.95 4.76 2.38 2.38 33.34 1.86 2 0.07 13.15 12 22505 2
Denmark 25.87 21.63 35.93 7.87 1.21 7.49 2.32 2 0.10 13.18 13 35062 1.73 1
Finland 15.83 15.61 36.97 18.70 3.02 9.87 2.75 3 0.24 11.98 12 33269 2.26 3
France 35.37 21.38 22.30 4.09 2.20 14.66 2.02 2 0.07 13.68 13 31455 3.69 1
Germany 44.29 23.66 19.39 2.79 0.90 8.97 1.82 2 0.04 10.68 11 32149 4.46 2
Great Britain 50.88 22.68 14.81 3.41 1.76 6.46 1.74 1 0.06 11.78 11 32766 0.72 2
Hungary 34.38 30.56 27.23 1.67 0.39 5.77 1.97 2 0.02 10.74 11 17960 1.87 2
Ireland 27.65 28.81 30.73 7.32 1.06 4.43 2.22 2 0.09 12.92 13 40168 0.28 2
Israel 26.68 16.49 26.68 12.10 13.92 4.13 2.69 3 0.27 13.41 12 24466 3
Japan 20.15 22.32 28.58 8.44 2.36 18.15 2.40 2 0.13 12.03 12 31607 1.34 2
Latvia 26.36 24.09 30.01 1.51 0.63 17.40 2.10 2 0.03 12.69 12 16536 2
Netherlands 37.84 26.95 23.86 2.47 0.95 7.93 1.93 2 0.04 13.59 13 36580 2.08 1
New Zealand 26.81 27.62 25.28 10.70 3.06 6.53 2.31 2 0.15 13.28 13 25306 1.02 3
Norway 36.37 29.80 19.28 5.01 1.13 8.41 1.96 2 0.07 13.45 13 49707 1.93 2
Philippines 17.92 19.58 37.67 11.50 5.58 7.75 2.64 3 0.19 9.66 10 3219 2
Poland 19.42 20.67 28.97 3.52 1.72 25.70 2.29 2 0.07 10.82 10 15401 2.38 2
Portugal 19.09 35.01 39.10 2.38 0.59 3.83 2.28 2 0.03 8.12 6 20488 0.56 2
Russia 39.01 25.14 10.26 1.64 1.68 22.27 1.74 1 0.04 11.59 12 13918 3
Slovak Republic 26.37 15.58 25.15 7.14 2.09 23.67 2.25 2 0.12 13.51 13 19241 2
Slovenia 16.71 32.05 43.34 2.48 0.37 5.05 2.34 2 0.03 11.20 11 25576 2
South Korea 9.13 23.35 34.52 17.57 5.32 10.11 2.85 3 0.25 12.30 12 23363 0.70 3
Spain 13.20 35.16 35.66 5.80 2.44 7.74 2.45 2 0.09 10.00 10 28333 0.36 2
Sweden 25.55 27.30 26.95 8.05 2.27 9.88 2.27 2 0.11 12.10 12 33760 2.11 2
Switzerland 16.91 27.02 45.64 5.11 0.32 5.00 2.42 3 0.06 11.36 10 36873 2.98 2
Taiwan 34.34 31.76 18.01 3.33 1.09 11.47 1.93 2 0.05 11.30 12 2
Uruguay 6.17 20.35 46.41 12.80 5.89 8.38 2.91 3 0.20 9.12 9 10609 2
USA 23.70 28.74 28.66 5.47 3.34 10.09 2.29 2 0.10 13.88 14 43227 5.32 2
Venezuela 20.04 28.38 42.18 3.95 2.81 2.64 2.40 3 0.07 11487 2
Overall 23.88 23.78 27.32 6.63 2.48 15.91 2.29 2 0.11 11.89 12 26374 1.96 2.1212
Pro Immig Opinion
average 
Pro Immig 
Opinion 
(7)
average 
Pro-
Immig 
Dummy 
(9)
Country
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
 
l
o
t
 
(
1
)
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
 
(
2
)
r
e
m
a
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
a
s
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
(
3
)
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
 
a
 
l
i
t
t
l
e
 
(
4
)
The survey sample excludes non-citizens. Pro Immig Opinion uses answers to the immigration question ("Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) should be ...": reduced a
lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot) and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a lot). Pro-Immig Dummy equals one if Pro Immig Opinion
is equal to 4 or 5, zero if Pro Immig Opinion is equal to 1, 2 or 3. Both variables exclude missing values. Data for columns (1)-(11) is from the 2003 ISSP National Identity Module. Data
for per capita GDP, PPP is for 2007 (World Development Indicators). Data for the relative skill mix is for 1999/2000/2001/2002 (Docquier (2007) and Barro and Lee (2000)). Data on
policy on immigration 2007 is from the United Nations.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (ISSP 2003) and country-level variables
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (WVS 1995) and country-level variables
The survey sample excludes foreign-born. net migration is equal to the net migration inflow, divided by the destination country's population, in 1996 (source: United Nations). Data for columns (1)-(11)
is from the 1995 WVS. Data for per capita GDP, PPP is for 1996 (World Development Indicators). Data for the relative skill mix is for 1990/1991/1996 (Docquier (2007) and Barro and Lee (2000)).
Data on net migration 1996 and on policy on immigration 1996 is from the United Nations.
don't know 
(5)
median Pro 
Immig 
Opinion (7)
net migration 
1996 (13)
relative skill 
mix (natives 
vs. imm) (12)
average educ 
attainment (9)
median educ 
attain. (10)
per capita 
GDP, PPP 
(11)
by year Too high Satisfactory Too low Total
1976 10 129 11 150
6.67 86 7.33 100
1986 33 125 6 164
20.12 76.22 3.66 100
1996 41 147 4 192
21.35 76.56 2.08 100
2007 34 150 11 195
17.44 76.92 5.64 100
Total 118 551 32 701
16.83 78.6 4.56 100
by income Too high Satisfactory Too low Total
high income 44 122 12 178
24.72 68.54 6.74 100
upper middle income 25 100 8 133
18.8 75.19 6.02 100
lower middle income 24 152 9 185
12.97 82.16 4.86 100
lower income 25 163 2 190
13.16 85.79 1.05 100
Total 118 537 31 686
17.2 78.28 4.52 100
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and by income. View on immigration is the
government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for
permanent settlement, temporary and high skilled work and family reunification. Governments' views
towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable. The possible
values of View on Immigration are: the government has indicated that immigration is too high, satisfactory,
too low.
Governments' view on immigration
Governments' view on immigration
Table 4. Governments' view on the level of immigration, by year and income
year Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total
1976 10 129 11 0 150
6.67 86 7.33 0 100
1986 33 125 6 0 164
20.12 76.22 3.66 0 100
1996 78 58 8 48 192
40.63 30.21 4.17 25 100
2007 38 114 11 32 195
19.49 58.46 5.64 16.41 100
Total 159 426 36 80 701
22.68 60.77 5.14 11.41 100
income Lower Maintain Raise No intervention Total
high income 66 96 14 2 178
37.08 53.93 7.87 1.12 100
upper middle income 29 90 8 6 133
21.8 67.67 6.02 4.51 100
lower middle income 31 118 11 25 185
16.76 63.78 5.95 13.51 100
lower income 32 111 2 45 190
16.84 58.42 1.05 23.68 100
Total 158 415 35 78 686
23.03 60.5 5.1 11.37 100
Policy on immigration
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. Policy on immigration is the government's
policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of Policy on Immigration are: The government
has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the overall level of immigration; the government does not intervene with
regard to the overall level of immigration.
Table 5. Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by year and income
Policy on immigration
year Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
1996 54 28 6 49 137
39.42 20.44 4.38 35.77 100
2007 34 92 10 21 157
21.66 58.6 6.37 13.38 100
Total 88 120 16 70 294
29.93 40.82 5.44 23.81 100
income Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
high income 34 34 9 3 80
42.5 42.5 11.25 3.75 100
upper middle income 19 35 2 7 63
30.16 55.56 3.17 11.11 100
lower middle income 21 33 4 20 78
26.92 42.31 5.13 25.64 100
lower income 13 16 0 40 69
18.84 23.19 0 57.97 100
Total 87 118 15 70 290
30 40.69 5.17 24.14 100
Table 6. Governments' policy on permanent settlement, by year and income
Policy on permanent settlement
Policy on permanent settlement
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. Policy on permanent settlement is the
government's policy on migration for the purpose of permanent settlement. The possible values of Policy on permanent
settlement are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise migration for permanent settlement; the
government does not intervene with regard to migration for permanent settlement (or It is not known whether the
government intervenes...).
year Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
1996 40 29 2 45 116
34.48 25 1.72 38.79 100
2007 41 99 9 16 165
24.85 60 5.45 9.7 100
Total 81 128 11 61 281
28.83 45.55 3.91 21.71 100
income Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
high income 29 39 5 5 78
37.18 50 6.41 6.41 100
upper middle income 16 39 2 7 64
25 60.94 3.13 10.94 100
lower middle income 18 33 2 21 74
24.32 44.59 2.7 28.38 100
lower income 16 17 1 28 62
25.81 27.42 1.61 45.16 100
Total 79 128 10 61 278
28.42 46.04 3.6 21.94 100
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. Policy on temporary workers is the
government's policy on the migration of temporary workers. The possible values of Policy on temporary workers are:
The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the migration for temporary workers; the government does
not intervene with regard to the migration of temporary workers (or It is not known whether the government intervenes...).
Table 7. Governments' policy on temporary workers, by year and income
Policy on temporary workers
Policy on temporary workers
year Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
1996 28 31 2 52 113
24.78 27.43 1.77 46.02 100
2007 12 95 8 25 140
8.57 67.86 5.71 17.86 100
Total 40 126 10 77 253
15.81 49.8 3.95 30.43 100
income Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
high income 18 47 4 7 76
23.68 61.84 5.26 9.21 100
upper middle income 8 33 2 14 57
14.04 57.89 3.51 24.56 100
lower middle income 7 37 2 19 65
10.77 56.92 3.08 29.23 100
lower income 7 9 2 36 54
12.96 16.67 3.7 66.67 100
Total 40 126 10 76 252
15.87 50 3.97 30.16 100
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. Policy on family reunification is the
government's policy concerning migration for the purpose of family reunification. The possible values of Policy on
family reunification are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise migration for the purpose of
family reunification; the government does not intervene with regard to migration for family reunification (or It is not
known whether the government intervenes...).
Policy on family reunification
Policy on family reunification
Table 8. Governments' policy on family reunification, by year and income
year Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
2007 5 84 36 19 144
3.47 58.33 25 13.19 100
Total 5 84 36 19 144
3.47 58.33 25 13.19 100
income Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total
high income 2 18 20 5 45
4.44 40 44.44 11.11 100
upper middle income 1 24 9 2 36
2.78 66.67 25 5.56 100
lower middle income 2 29 4 2 37
5.41 78.38 10.81 5.41 100
lower income 0 13 3 9 25
0 52 12 36 100
Total 5 84 36 18 143
3.5 58.74 25.17 12.59 100
 Policy on highly skilled workers
 Policy on highly skilled workers
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and by income. Policy on highly skilled workers is the
government's policy on the migration of highly skilled workers. The possible values of Policy on highly skilled
workers are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the migration of highly skilled workers;
the government does not intervene with regard to the migration of highly skilled workers (or It is not known whether
the government intervenes...).
Table 9. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers, by year and income
year No Yes Total region No Yes Total
1996 67 52 119 Central Asia 3 6 9
56.3 43.7 100 33.33 66.67 100
2007 45 79 124 East Asia & Pacific 14 12 26
36.29 63.71 100 53.85 46.15 100
Total 112 131 243 Eastern Europe 10 22 32
46.09 53.91 100 31.25 68.75 100
Gulf countries 2 2 4
50 50 100
Latin America & Car. 24 21 45
53.33 46.67 100
Middle East 5 3 8
62.5 37.5 100
North America 3 4 7
income No Yes Total 42.86 57.14 100
high income 13 61 74 North Africa 2 2 4
17.57 82.43 100 50 50 100
upper middle income 18 32 50 South Asia 10 2 12
36 64 100 83.33 16.67 100
lower middle income 38 21 59 Sub-Saharan Africa 36 20 56
64.41 35.59 100 64.29 35.71 100
lower income 43 16 59 Western Europe 3 36 39
72.88 27.12 100 7.69 92.31 100
Total 112 130 242 Total 112 130 242
46.28 53.72 100 46.28 53.72 100
Integration of non-citizens
Integration of non-citizens
Integration of non-citizens is government's policies or programmes to foster the integration of non-citizens into society.
The possible values are: Yes, the government has policies or programmes to foster the integration of non-citizens (e.g.,
language classes, provision of social services); No, the government has no policies or programmes to foster the integration
of non-citizens (or It is not known whether the government has a policy or programme to foster the integration of non-
citizens into society).
Table 10. Policies on integration of non-
citizens, by year
Table 11. Policies on integration of non-
citizens, by income
Table 12. Policies on integration of non-
citizens, by region
Integration of non-citizens
OLS 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable
median Immig Opinion 0.125 0.2917
0.2087 0.2011
average Immig Opinion 0.3482 0.8566
0.3706 0.5204
average Pro Immig Dummy 3.8068 1.3401
2.1883+ 0.7986+
Constant 1.1136 0.6257 1.0856 0.75 -0.6526 0.8003
0.4359* 0.7952 0.1989** 0.516 1.3018 0.4193+
Observations 22 22 22 31 31 31
R-squared 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.09
1 2 3
0.3352
0.1759+
0.6934
0.2650*
4.2208
1.0454**
1.3743 0.5523 1.6865
0.3955** 0.6008 0.1304**
37 37 37
0.09 0.16 0.32
using attitudes from ISSP 1995 using attitudes from WVS 1995
Table 13. The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants (ISSP 1995 and WVS 1995) on 
migration policy, 1996
migration policy, 1996
average Pro Immig Dummy
Data source: 1995 ISSP National Identity Module, WVS 1995 and United Nations. Standard errors in parentheses. +
significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
OLS
Dependent variable
median Immig Opinion
R-squared
Table 14. The impact of individual attitudes towards 
immigrants (ISSP 2003) on migration policy, 2007
migration policy, 2007
Data source: 2003 ISSP National Identity Module and United Nations.
Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **
significant at 1%
Constant
Observations
average Immig Opinion
Figure 1. The tax adjustment model
Figure 2. The benefit adjustment model
Figure 3: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (ISSP 1995, United Nations 2007)
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Figure 4: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (ISSP 2003, United Nations 2007)
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Figure 5: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (WVS 1995, United Nations 2007)
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region Too high Satisfactory Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv, Total
Central Asia 0 15 1 16 1 8 1 6 16
0 93.75 6.25 100 6.25 50 6.25 37.5 100
East Asia & Pacific 10 77 5 92 12 71 5 4 92
10.87 83.7 5.43 100 13.04 77.17 5.43 4.35 100
Eastern Europe 6 49 1 56 12 39 1 4 56
10.71 87.5 1.79 100 21.43 69.64 1.79 7.14 100
Gulf countries 11 12 1 24 12 10 1 1 24
45.83 50 4.17 100 50 41.67 4.17 4.17 100
Latin America & Caribbean 14 104 8 126 18 89 9 10 126
11.11 82.54 6.35 100 14.29 70.63 7.14 7.94 100
Middle East 8 14 6 28 9 13 6 0 28
28.57 50 21.43 100 32.14 46.43 21.43 0 100
North America 4 10 1 15 3 10 1 1 15
26.67 66.67 6.67 100 20 66.67 6.67 6.67 100
North Africa 6 9 1 16 6 8 1 1 16
37.5 56.25 6.25 100 37.5 50 6.25 6.25 100
South Asia 8 30 1 39 11 25 2 1 39
20.51 76.92 2.56 100 28.21 64.1 5.13 2.56 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 153 5 182 32 94 7 49 182
13.19 84.07 2.75 100 17.58 51.65 3.85 26.92 100
Western Europe 27 64 1 92 42 48 1 1 92
29.35 69.57 1.09 100 45.65 52.17 1.09 1.09 100
Total 118 537 31 686 158 415 35 78 686
17.2 78.28 4.52 100 23.03 60.5 5.1 11.37 100
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
Table A1. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by region
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.
region Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
Central Asia 1 6 1 4 12 1 7 0 3 11
8.33 50 8.33 33.33 100 9.09 63.64 0 27.27 100
East Asia & Pacific 10 18 4 3 35 11 21 4 2 38
28.57 51.43 11.43 8.57 100 28.95 55.26 10.53 5.26 100
Eastern Europe 12 21 1 2 36 10 20 2 4 36
33.33 58.33 2.78 5.56 100 27.78 55.56 5.56 11.11 100
Gulf countries 4 0 0 2 6 7 0 0 1 8
66.67 0 0 33.33 100 87.5 0 0 12.5 100
Latin America & Car. 11 29 2 14 56 8 29 1 14 52
19.64 51.79 3.57 25 100 15.38 55.77 1.92 26.92 100
Middle East 5 3 2 0 10 5 3 0 2 10
50 30 20 0 100 50 30 0 20 100
North America 3 2 1 1 7 0 4 1 1 6
42.86 28.57 14.29 14.29 100 0 66.67 16.67 16.67 100
North Africa 2 1 0 1 4 3 2 0 1 6
50 25 0 25 100 50 33.33 0 16.67 100
South Asia 6 4 2 3 15 2 9 0 4 15
40 26.67 13.33 20 100 13.33 60 0 26.67 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 13 13 2 39 67 17 12 1 27 57
19.4 19.4 2.99 58.21 100 29.82 21.05 1.75 47.37 100
Western Europe 20 21 0 1 42 15 21 1 2 39
47.62 50 0 2.38 100 38.46 53.85 2.56 5.13 100
Total 87 118 15 70 290 79 128 10 61 278
30 40.69 5.17 24.14 100 28.42 46.04 3.6 21.94 100
region Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
Central Asia 0 5 1 0 6 0 3 0 4 7
0 83.33 16.67 0 100 0 42.86 0 57.14 100
East Asia & Pacific 0 14 8 0 22 3 20 4 5 32
0 63.64 36.36 0 100 9.38 62.5 12.5 15.63 100
Eastern Europe 0 10 6 2 18 5 22 1 7 35
0 55.56 33.33 11.11 100 14.29 62.86 2.86 20 100
Gulf countries 2 3 0 0 5 3 4 0 1 8
40 60 0 0 100 37.5 50 0 12.5 100
Latin America & Car. 0 28 4 0 32 7 28 1 13 49
0 87.5 12.5 0 100 14.29 57.14 2.04 26.53 100
Middle East 1 5 0 1 7 1 4 0 2 7
14.29 71.43 0 14.29 100 14.29 57.14 0 28.57 100
North America 0 0 2 1 3 1 3 1 1 6
0 0 66.67 33.33 100 16.67 50 16.67 16.67 100
North Africa 0 3 0 0 3 1 3 0 1 5
0 100 0 0 100 20 60 0 20 100
South Asia 1 4 2 0 7 3 5 0 5 13
14.29 57.14 28.57 0 100 23.08 38.46 0 38.46 100
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 4 3 10 18 7 9 2 34 52
5.56 22.22 16.67 55.56 100 13.46 17.31 3.85 65.38 100
Western Europe 0 8 10 4 22 9 25 1 3 38
0 36.36 45.45 18.18 100 23.68 65.79 2.63 7.89 100
Total 5 84 36 18 143 40 126 10 76 252
3.5 58.74 25.17 12.59 100 15.87 50 3.97 30.16 100
Table A2. Governments' policy on permanent settlement and on temporary workers, by region
Table A3. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers and on family reunification, by region
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.
Policy on permanent settlement Policy on temporary workers
 Policy on highly skilled workers Policy on family reunification
The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.
HDI classification Too high Satisfact Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 13 96 0 109 17 61 0 31 109
11.93 88.07 0 100 15.6 55.96 0 28.44 100
medium human dev. 48 239 14 301 57 186 16 42 301
15.95 79.4 4.65 100 18.94 61.79 5.32 13.95 100
high human dev. 22 113 6 141 31 100 6 4 141
15.6 80.14 4.26 100 21.99 70.92 4.26 2.84 100
very high human dev. 32 80 11 123 47 62 13 1 123
26.02 65.04 8.94 100 38.21 50.41 10.57 0.81 100
Total 115 528 31 674 152 409 35 78 674
17.06 78.34 4.6 100 22.55 60.68 5.19 11.57 100
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
Table A4. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by human development index
Year 1976
HDI classification Too high Satisfact Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 1 24 0 25 1 24 0 25
4 96 0 100 4 96 0 100
medium human dev. 2 56 6 64 2 56 6 64
3.13 87.5 9.38 100 3.13 87.5 9.38 100
high human dev. 1 23 3 27 1 23 3 27
3.7 85.19 11.11 100 3.7 85.19 11.11 100
very high human dev. 5 22 2 29 5 22 2 29
17.24 75.86 6.9 100 17.24 75.86 6.9 100
Total 9 125 11 145 9 125 11 145
6.21 86.21 7.59 100 6.21 86.21 7.59 100
Year 1986
HDI classification Too high Satisfact Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 4 23 0 27 4 23 0 27
14.81 85.19 0 100 14.81 85.19 0 100
medium human dev. 13 54 4 71 10 57 4 71
18.31 76.06 5.63 100 14.08 80.28 5.63 100
high human dev. 5 24 1 30 3 26 1 30
16.67 80 3.33 100 10 86.67 3.33 100
very high human dev. 10 19 1 30 13 16 1 30
33.33 63.33 3.33 100 43.33 53.33 3.33 100
Total 32 120 6 158 30 122 6 158
20.25 75.95 3.8 100 18.99 77.22 3.8 100
Table A4. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by human development index and by year
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
Year 1996
HDI classification Too high Satisfact Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 4 24 0 28 8 6 0 14 28
14.29 85.71 0 100 28.57 21.43 0 50 100
medium human dev. 14 68 1 83 25 26 4 28 83
16.87 81.93 1.2 100 30.12 31.33 4.82 33.73 100
high human dev. 11 29 1 41 19 17 1 4 41
26.83 70.73 2.44 100 46.34 41.46 2.44 9.76 100
very high human dev. 11 19 2 32 23 5 3 1 32
34.38 59.38 6.25 100 71.88 15.63 9.38 3.13 100
Total 40 140 4 184 75 54 8 47 184
21.74 76.09 2.17 100 40.76 29.35 4.35 25.54 100
Year 2007
HDI classification Too high Satisfact Too low Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 4 25 0 29 4 8 0 17 29
13.79 86.21 0 100 13.79 27.59 0 58.62 100
medium human dev. 19 61 3 83 20 47 2 14 83
22.89 73.49 3.61 100 24.1 56.63 2.41 16.87 100
high human dev. 5 37 1 43 8 34 1 0 43
11.63 86.05 2.33 100 18.6 79.07 2.33 0 100
very high human dev. 6 20 6 32 6 19 7 0 32
18.75 62.5 18.75 100 18.75 59.38 21.88 0 100
Total 34 143 10 187 38 108 10 31 187
18.18 76.47 5.35 100 20.32 57.75 5.35 16.58 100
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
Government's view on immigration Policy on immigration
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 5 9 0 25 39 9 7 0 18 34
12.82 23.08 0 64.1 100 26.47 20.59 0 52.94 100
medium human dev. 35 43 5 38 121 32 46 3 34 115
28.93 35.54 4.13 31.4 100 27.83 40 2.61 29.57 100
high human dev. 22 39 1 5 67 17 45 2 5 69
32.84 58.21 1.49 7.46 100 24.64 65.22 2.9 7.25 100
very high human dev 25 23 9 1 58 22 26 5 3 56
43.1 39.66 15.52 1.72 100 39.29 46.43 8.93 5.36 100
Total 87 114 15 69 285 80 124 10 60 274
30.53 40 5.26 24.21 100 29.2 45.26 3.65 21.9 100
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 0 3 1 7 11 5 3 1 22 31
0 27.27 9.09 63.64 100 16.13 9.68 3.23 70.97 100
medium human dev. 3 43 9 5 60 9 48 3 39 99
5 71.67 15 8.33 100 9.09 48.48 3.03 39.39 100
high human dev. 1 28 8 3 40 12 39 2 10 63
2.5 70 20 7.5 100 19.05 61.9 3.17 15.87 100
very high human dev 1 9 18 2 30 14 33 4 5 56
3.33 30 60 6.67 100 25 58.93 7.14 8.93 100
Total 5 83 36 17 141 40 123 10 76 249
3.55 58.87 25.53 12.06 100 16.06 49.4 4.02 30.52 100
Table A5. Governments' policy on permanent settlement and on temporary workers, by HDI
Table A6. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers and on family reunification, by HDI
Policy on temporary workers
Policy on family reunification
Policy on permanent settlement
 Policy on highly skilled workers
Year 1996
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 3 4 0 16 23 6 2 0 11 19
13.04 17.39 0 69.57 100 31.58 10.53 0 57.89 100
medium human dev. 17 10 3 28 58 12 7 1 26 46
29.31 17.24 5.17 48.28 100 26.09 15.22 2.17 56.52 100
high human dev. 14 8 0 4 26 9 12 0 5 26
53.85 30.77 0 15.38 100 34.62 46.15 0 19.23 100
very high human dev. 19 4 3 1 27 13 7 1 3 24
70.37 14.81 11.11 3.7 100 54.17 29.17 4.17 12.5 100
Total 53 26 6 49 134 40 28 2 45 115
39.55 19.4 4.48 36.57 100 34.78 24.35 1.74 39.13 100
Year 1996
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 3 2 0 14 19
15.79 10.53 0 73.68 100
medium human dev. 6 10 2 26 44
13.64 22.73 4.55 59.09 100
high human dev. 10 7 0 8 25
40 28 0 32 100
very high human dev. 9 11 0 4 24
37.5 45.83 0 16.67 100
Total 28 30 2 52 112
25 26.79 1.79 46.43 100
Table A5. Governments' policy on permanent settlem
Policy on permanent settlement Policy on temporary workers
Table A6. Governments' policy on highly skilled work
 Policy on highly skilled workers Policy on family reunification
Year 2007
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 2 5 0 9 16 3 5 0 7 15
12.5 31.25 0 56.25 100 20 33.33 0 46.67 100
medium human dev. 18 33 2 10 63 20 39 2 8 69
28.57 52.38 3.17 15.87 100 28.99 56.52 2.9 11.59 100
high human dev. 8 31 1 1 41 8 33 2 0 43
19.51 75.61 2.44 2.44 100 18.6 76.74 4.65 0 100
very high human dev. 6 19 6 0 31 9 19 4 0 32
19.35 61.29 19.35 0 100 28.13 59.38 12.5 0 100
Total 34 88 9 20 151 40 96 8 15 159
22.52 58.28 5.96 13.25 100 25.16 60.38 5.03 9.43 100
Year 2007
HDI classification
Lower Maintain Raise No interv Total Lower Maintain Raise No interv. Total
low human dev. 0 3 1 7 11 2 1 1 8 12
0 27.27 9.09 63.64 100 16.67 8.33 8.33 66.67 100
medium human dev. 3 43 9 5 60 3 38 1 13 55
5 71.67 15 8.33 100 5.45 69.09 1.82 23.64 100
high human dev. 1 28 8 3 40 2 32 2 2 38
2.5 70 20 7.5 100 5.26 84.21 5.26 5.26 100
very high human dev. 1 9 18 2 30 5 22 4 1 32
3.33 30 60 6.67 100 15.63 68.75 12.5 3.13 100
Total 5 83 36 17 141 12 93 8 24 137
3.55 58.87 25.53 12.06 100 8.76 67.88 5.84 17.52 100
ment and on temporary workers, by HDI and by year
 Policy on highly skilled workers Policy on family reunification
Policy on permanent settlement Policy on temporary workers
kers and on family reunification, by HDI and by year
probit 1 2 3 4 5 6
dependent variable
year
net migration, divided by population 2.34041133 -2.57638449 42.55180421 -0.12215755
4.68707925 5.20404834 13.10843051** 9.48110047
per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) 0.00001723 0.00002572
0.00000470** 0.00000684**
relative skill mix (natives vs. imm.) 0.1061808 0.00002797
0.05510909+ 0.00056058
Observations 117 113 24 118 108 27
Standard errors in parentheses. The table reports marginal effects.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
probit 1 2 3 4 5 6
dependent variable
year
net migration, divided by population 2.34041133 3.50589187 42.55180421 27.04520477
4.68707925 4.75068949 13.10843051** 13.74180074*
human development index 1.08835177 1.18374051
0.27183735** 0.30364651**
relative skill mix (natives vs. imm.) 0.1061808 0.00002797
0.05510909+ 0.00056058
Observations 117 116 24 118 117 27
Standard errors in parentheses. The table reports marginal effects.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The dependent variable policy on the integration of non-citizens indicates whether or not (1 and 0, respectively) there exists a policy to foster the
integration of non-citizens
Table A7 (cont.). The determinants of the policy on the integration of non-citizens
policy on the integration of non-citizens
1996 2007
Table A7. The determinants of the policy on the integration of non-citizens
The dependent variable policy on the integration of non-citizens indicates whether or not (1 and 0, respectively) there exists a policy to foster the
integration of non-citizens
policy on the integration of non-citizens
1996 2007
OLS 1 2 3 4
Dependent variable
median Immig Opinion 0.002
0.0007*
average Immig Opinion 0.0035
0.0013*
average Pro Immig Dummy 0.0159
0.0088+
migration policy, 1996 -0.0002
0.0009
Constant -0.0025 -0.006 0.0003 0.0017
0.0015 0.0028* 0.0008 0.0013
Observations 22 22 22 22
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.14 0
net migration, 1996 (divided by population)
Table A8. The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants and migration policy on migration 
inflows (ISSP 1995 and United Nations)
Data source: 1995 ISSP National Identity Module and United Nations. Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; *
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Figure A1: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration inflows (ISSP 1995, United Nations)
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Figure A2: The impact of migration policy on migration inflows (United Nations 2007, United Nations)
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